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I. INTRODUCTION
There are two types of Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) regulation: "Jewish mother" and positive incentive. The
all-too-familiar Jewish mother approach relies on raised eyebrows, guilt,
and punishment, whereas positive incentive is permissive and offers re-
wards to encourage certain types of behavior. The minority tax certificate
policy was an example of the latter. It used the market-based incentive of
deferral of capital gains to encourage the owners of broadcast and cable
properties to sell them to minorities. Tax certificates also were issued to
investors who provided start-up capital of minority-controlled companies.
Congress eliminated tax certificates in the spring of 1995 and less
than one year later enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act
or Act).' This Act ushered in a new era in the broadcast industry--one
where increased consolidation of ownership of broadcast stations has re-
sulted in limited opportunities for minority entrepreneurs to own broadcast
properties and to compete meaningfully in the broadcast industry.2 Minor-
ity entrepreneurs also continue to face difficulties competing in the tele-
communications industry largely as a result of their continued inability to
acquire access to sufficient capital to compete in the provision of wireless
and other communications services.3 These circumstances have led to calls
for the reestablishment of the FCC's Minority Tax Certificate Program-a
mechanism that prior to its elimination by Congress in 1995, enabled sig-
nificant numbers of minorities to purchase broadcast and cable properties.
Indeed, one of the main proponents of this program has been FCC Chair-
man William E. Kennard, the first African American to head the FCC.4
This Article first examines the history and benefits of the FCC' s pre-
vious minority tax certificate program and the reasons why Congress
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
2. See generally NTIA, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Minority Commercial Broadcast
Ownership in the United States (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98> [hereinafter NT/A Report].
3. See Section 257 Proceeding to Identify and Eliminate Market Entry Barriers for
Small Businesses, Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 16,802, para. 215, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1112
(1997) [hereinafter Market Entry Barriers Report].
4. See, e.g., Kennard Suggests New Approach to Tax Certificates, COMM. DAiLY,
Nov. 12, 1998, at 1.
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eliminated it in 1995. The Article suggests ways in which a new tax cer-
tificate program could be developed to address those concerns. In short,
the Authors believe that the tax certificate program is worth restoring, es-
pecially in light of the erosion of the number of minority-owned stations
and cable properties and the goal of enabling minorities to benefit from the
ownership opportunities presented by the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
II. THE HISTORY AND BENEFITS OF THE FCC's MINoRrrY TAX
CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
A. The Minority Tax Certificate Program: A Method of Fostering
Program Diversity
The FCC's tax certificate policy was based on former section 1071 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which empowered the Commission to certify
that a sale or exchange of property is "necessary or appropriate to effectu-
ate a change in policy of, or the adoption of a new policy by, the Commis-
sion with respect to the ownership and control of radio broadcasting sta-
tions .... Congress enacted this section in 1943 in response to the FCC's
adoption that same year of so-called "multiple ownership rules. 7 These
rules limited the number of broadcast stations that a company could own in
a single market and nationwide. "Section 1071 was originally designed to
5. Many of the proposals are based on suggestions proffered by William E. Kennard
when he served as the FCC's General Counsel. See FCC's Tax Certificate Program: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. 102 (1995) (statement of William E.
Kennard, General Counsel, FCC).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (repealed 1995). This section provided, in pertinent part:
If the sale or exchange of property (including stock in a corporation) is certified
by the Federal Communications Commission to be necessary or appropriate to ef-
fectuate a change in policy of, or the adoption of a new policy by, the Commis-
sion with respect to the ownership and control of radio broadcasting stations, such
sale or exchange shall, if the taxpayer so elects, be treated as an involuntary con-
version of such property within the meaning of section 1033. For purposes of
such section ... stock of a corporation operating a radio broadcasting station,
whether or not representing control of such corporation, shall be treated as a
property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted. The part
of the gain, if any, on such sale or exchange to which section 1033 is not applied
shall nevertheless not be recognized, if the taxpayer so elects, to the extent that it
is applied to reduce the basis for determining gain or loss on sale or exchange of
property, of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation.. . , remaining
in the hands of the taxpayer immediately after the sale or exchange, or acquired
the same taxable year.
Id.
7. Multiple Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1998).
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lessen the hardship imposed on broadcasters who were forced to divest
stations under the multiple ownership rules."8
In the late 1970s, the FCC sought to create new opportunities for mi-
nority ownership in broadcasting. Several organizations, including the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (NAB), National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA), the National Black Media Coali-
tion, and the Congressional Black Caucus, met in 1977 under the auspices
of the FCC to address the underrepresentation of minorities in broadcast-
ing. That year, the NAB filed a Petition for Rule Making urging the FCC to
extend its tax certificate policy to promote minority ownership.9
Under this program, a seller could acquire a tax certificate under two
circumstances: (1) when an owner of a broadcast or cable property desired
to sell to a minority purchaser, and (2) when an investor that contributed
"start-up" capital to a minority-controlled entity operating a broadcast or
cable property sold an interest in that company. The tax certificate enabled
the seller in either case to defer the payment of federal income taxes oth-
erwise due if: (a) the proceeds were reinvested in appropriate "qualified
replacement property" and/or (b) to the extent any of the gain attributable
to the ownership interest sold, the seller elected to reduce the tax basis of
appropriate depreciable property (whether or not used in connection with a
broadcasting or cable business) owned immediately after the sale acquired
within the same taxable year of the sale. This program allowed sellers to
defer the payment of taxes to encourage the sale or investment in minority-
controlled companies operating a broadcast or cable property. The seller's
anticipated tax savings also enabled the minority company to negotiate for
a reduction in the purchase price.
In adopting this policy in 1978, the Commission concluded that:
It is apparent that there is a dearth of minority ownership in the broad-
cast industry. Full minority participation in the ownership and man-
agement of broadcast facilities results in a more diverse selection of
programming. In addition, an increase in ownership by minorities will
inevitably enhance the diversity of control of a limited resource, the
spectrum.
Moreover, the Commission concluded that "affecting programming
by means of increased minority ownership-as is also the case both with
8. Erwin G. Krasnow et al., Maximizing the Benefits of Tax Certificates in Broadcast
and Cable Ventures, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 753, 754 (1991).
9. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Public
Notice, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983, 42 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1689, 1695 (1978) [hereinafter
1978 Policy Statement]. See also Policy Statement on Minority Ownership of Cable Televi-
sion Facilities, Public Notice, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1469 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Pol-
icy Statement].
10. 1978 Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d at 981, 42 Rad. Reg. 2d at 1692.
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respect to [its] equal employment opportunity and ascertainment poli-
cies-avoids direct government intrusion into programming decisions."'"
The Commission reached similar conclusions in extending the program to
cable television in 1982.
As in broadcasting, adequate representation of minority views in ca-
ble television programming enhances the goal of diversified program-
ming which is an objective of both the Communications Act of 1934
and of the First Amendment. Moreover, because cable television sys-
tem operators exercise editorial discretion with respect for broadcast
program selection and cable origination programming, insensitivity on
their part to minority issues and viewpoints could undercut our con-
tinuin efforts to increase the diversity of viewpoints in program-
rmng.
Thus, the Commission viewed the Minority Tax Certificate Program not
simply as a method of increasing minority ownership of broadcast and ca-
ble facilities, but as a nonintrusive method of encouraging the diversity of
ideas and viewpoints in both broadcast and cable programming.
B. The Minority Tax Certificate Program: A Successful Tool for
Increasing Minority Participation in the Communications
Industry
On close examination, it is quite clear that the FCC's Minority Tax
Certificate Program fulfilled the goals intended by the Commission. In-
deed, the program apparently worked so well that Congress itself in-
structed the Commission to consider tax certificates as a method of ensur-
ing opportunities for minorities and other entrepreneurs in spectrum-based
services subject to competitive bidding.13
For the taxpayers that sold their broadcast or cable property, the pro-
gram allowed a deferral of taxes on any gain from the sale that otherwise
would have been due to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 4 In addition,
the certificates permitted taxpayers to diversify a portfolio of assets on a
tax-free basis.'
At the same time, this program made it easier for minority entrepre-
neurs to purchase broadcast and cable properties by providing them with a
bargaining chip by which they could negotiate a reduction in purchase
11. Id.
12. 1982 Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 1471.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (1994).
14. Krasnow et al., supra note 8, at 756.
15. Id.
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price. 16 As a result, this program opened doors at financial institutions that
previously had been closed to minority entrepreneurs. 7
More importantly, the FCC's Minority Tax Certificate Program was
an effective and nonintrusive tool in increasing the number of minority
owners in the broadcast and cable industries that, in turn, furthered what
Congress itself once called "the Nation's policy favoring diversity in the
expression of views in the electronic media."' 8 Prior to the adoption of the
minority tax certificate policy in 1978, minorities owned only 40 out of
8,500 broadcast stations. During the more than fifteen years of the policy's
existence, the issuance of minority tax certificates resulted in the acquisi-
tion of 288 radio stations, 43 television stations, and 31 cable systems. 19
"According to a study by the National Association of Black Owned Broad-
casters, the vast majority of major-market minority broadcasters used tax
certificates to attract initial investors, to purchase a broadcast station or to
sell a broadcast property to another minority."
2
The success of the tax certificate program in fostering increased par-
ticipation of minorities in the broadcast and cable industries apparently led
Congress, in enacting the competitive bidding provisions of the Communi-
cations Act in 1993, to authorize the FCC to use the certificate as a tool to
"ensure that small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women are given the opportu-S ,,21
nity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. Indeed,
the FCC adopted tax certificates as a measure to ensure the participation of
minorities and women in the provision of narrowband22 and broadband
PCS services23 as well as other wireless services subject to competitive
bidding.24 In adopting the use of tax certificates in these and other wireless
16. Id. at 755. See also Erwin Krasnow, A Case for Minority Tax Certificates, BRDCST.
& CABLE, Dec. 15, 1997, at 80 [hereinafter Krasnow, Minority Tax Certificates].
17. Krasnow, Minority Tax Certificates, supra note 16.
18. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 22(a)(2), 106 Stat. 1460.
19. Krasnow, Minority Tax Certificates, supra note 16.
20. Id. at 80.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (1994).
22. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Third Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2941, paras. 81-84, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 230
(1994).
23. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, paras. 142-47, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 859
(1994) [hereinafter Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order].
24. Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fourth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2330, paras. 48-52, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
188 (1994) (permitting the use of tax certificates in the Interactive Video and Data Service
(IVDS)).
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services, the Commission stated that this tool would reduce obstacles faced
by minorities and women in accessing capital by "encourag[ing] invest-
ment in minority and women-owned companies." ' Thus, it is clear that by
1995, tax certificates had proven to be a significantly successful tool in re-
ducing obstacles to minority ownership in the communications industry.
C. The Decision to Kill the Minority Tax Certificate Program: To
Pay for a New Tax Benefit or Eliminate a Perceived "Minority
Preference" Program?
Despite the many public interest benefits of the FCC's Minority Tax
Certificate Program, Congress repealed the program in 1995.26 Several rea-
sons played a role in Congress's decision. The primary reason members of
Congress offered for eliminating the FCC's tax certificate program was
that doing so was necessary to pay the costs of restoring a popular health-
care tax deduction for farmers and the self-employed.27 However, the pri-
mary catalyst for the action was a plan by Viacom to sell its cable systems
to a minority-led group for $2.3 billion and to use the tax certificate to de-
fer $400 million in federal taxes and as much as $200 million in state
taxes.2 Many members of Congress voiced outrage at what they perceived
was a giant tax loophole for big corporations. For example, in debating the
repeal of the FCC tax certificate program, Senator Robert Dole described
the program as a "tax break for millionaires."29 Similarly, Senator Larry
Pressler stated, "[w]hen the choice is between giving multibillion dollar
corporations a tax break or giving small businesses, farmers and ranchers
relief for health insurance coverage, the choice is clear. ' 30 Members of the
House expressed similar sentiments. For example, Representative Sam
Johnson called the Minority Tax Certificate Program a "voluntary, loosely-
defined, unsupervised, open-ended tax giveaway entitlement program."
31
The Minority Tax Certificate Program received additional criticism
as another example of an unfair preference based on race. Representative
Phillip Crane, for example, called the repeal of the program an end to "the
25. Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, supra note 23, para. 143. These cer-
tificates were eliminated from the FCC's rules once Congress repealed section 1071.
26. Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. No.
104-7, § 2, 109 Stat. 93, 93-94 (1995) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994)).
27. Krasnow, Minority Tax Certificates, supra note 16.
28. Id. See also Mark Bobichaux, A Cable Empire that Was Built on a Tax Break,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995, atB1.
29. 141 CONG. REc. S4551, S4559 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
30. Id. at S4557 (statement of Sen. Pressler).
31. 141 CONG. REc. H1912, H1922 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. John-
son).
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discriminatory provision that falls under the definition of affirmative ac-
tion. 32 Senator Robert Packwood characterized the program as a "set[]
aside [of] part of the television and radio spectrum for women and minori-
ties. 33
Aside from these issues, both the Senate and House Reports accom-
panying each version of the legislation raised concerns about the admini-
stration and implementation of the FCC Minority Tax Certification Pro-
gram. For example, one concern raised was whether the FCC, in
establishing the Minority Tax Certificate Program, had ventured "far be-
yond what Congress originally contemplated" in enacting section 1071. 
34
In this regard, the Senate argued that while Congress originally had in-
tended section 1071 to "alleviate the burden of taxpayers who had been
forced to sell their radio stations under difficult wartime circumstances,"
the FCC had interpreted the provision to permit the grant of "unlimited tax
benefits for routine and voluntary sales of a wide range of communications
properties. 35
In addition, Congress raised concerns regarding what it characterized
as "vague" FCC standards that according to Congress, allowed instances of
"significant abuse."'36 For example, the Senate questioned whether the
FCC's definition of "control" provided any assurance that a minority
would manage the broadcast property it had acquired through the certified
sale.37 Moreover, both the House and Senate expressed concern over what
they perceived to be the short periods of time that minority entities ap-
peared to hold on to properties acquired through certified transactions. The
Senate, for example, stated that because of the FCC's one-year holding pe-
riod, section 1071 had "frequently resulted in only transitory minority
ownership of broadcast properties."38 Similarly, the House cited average
holding periods for broadcast stations acquired in certified transactions of
2.25 years for television licenses and 3.5 years for radio licenses as evi-
dence that the program did not result in bonafide minority ownership.39
Congress also raised concerns about the administration of the pro-
gram. Specifically, it noted that the program had not been supervised or
reviewed by the IRS, or any other government body that could evaluate the
32. Id. at H1923 (statement of Rep. Crane).
33. 141 CONG. REc. S4532, S4538 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pack-
wood).
34. S. REP. No. 104-16, at 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 89, 98.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-32, at 13 (1995).
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tax cost of the program.4 Further, it argued that the FCC failed to consider
these issues41 or to require a showing or representation that any of the
benefits of the program actually went to the minority buyer.42 Finally,
Congress questioned the soundness of a policy that would allow a federal
government agency broad discretion to implement an "open-ended enti-
tlement program with no constraints.' 43
Although there arguably was merit to some of Congress's specific
concerns regarding the tax certificate program, many criticisms were based
either on misinformation or misunderstandings about the program. Politi-
cal ideology also played a significant role in the decision to end the pro-
gram. Many conservative members of Congress had a simple desire to end
what they viewed as an unfair minority preference."However, contrary to
views expressed during the congressional debates, the tax certificate pro-
gram did not involve a "set-aside" or "preference" in the award of spec-
trum licenses to minorities. The program did not result in the denial of li-
censes to white-owned businesses and did not guarantee the grant of a
license to the minority entrepreneur. Indeed, the program offered no guar-
antee to minority entrepreneurs regarding the success or profitability of the
broadcast station or cable system once acquired.
Moreover, the program was completely voluntary. Sellers were not
required to sell to minorities and were not penalized if they chose not to do
so. Rather, the Minority Tax Certificate Program offered a tax-based in-
centive to sellers to sell their properties to minorities. In this regard, the
program was no different than other tax benefits that exist for sales of
property. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, despite Congress's actions, Viacom
was still able to take advantage of other existing tax-saving provisions
when it ultimately sold its cable properties.45 Thus, the only thing Congress
put an end to was the sale of those properties to a minority-owned com-
pany.
Second, contrary to the suggestions by some members of Congress,
the tax certificate program did not involve a "tax giveaway." Rather, this
program allowed sellers to defer capital gains taxes on the sold property.
The federal government still enjoyed the benefits of receiving taxes on the
transaction and of indirectly receiving taxes from the new minority-owned
40. S. REP. No. 104-16, at 17; H.R. REP. No. 104-32, at 13.
41. S. REP. No. 104-16, at 17.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 29-33.
45. Krasnow, Minority Tax Certificates, supra note 16.
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business. 46 Thus, it was inaccurate to claim that the program resulted in a
loss of millions of dollars in tax revenue. Indeed, the program actually
provided benefits to taxpayers.
By involving otherwise excluded minorities in media ownership, more
broadcast and cable properties reached their highest valued use,
thereby creating jobs and generating investment and tax revenues.
[Moreover,] the policy's reinvestment feature retain[ed] capital in me-
dia industries, where it help[ed] to build the communications infra-
structure. Furthermore, the policy heW[ed] minority businesses suc-
ceed and ultimately become taxpayers.
In addition, minorities who purchased properties in certified transac-
tions did receive benefits-the opportunities to compete with members of
the "old boys network" in the acquisition of communications properties
and, thus, to participate as owners in the communications industry. The
American people also benefited because this increase in minority owner-
ship resulted in the offering of a more diverse array of views and pro-
gramming on the electronic media. Moreover, in originally authorizing the
FCC to use tax certificates as a method of ensuring opportunities for des-
ignated entities in spectrum-based services subject to auction, Congress
was, in effect, recognizing the benefits of tax certificates in increasing op-
portunities for minority participation in the communications industry. In
light of these facts, it is clear that the Minority Tax Certificate Program
provided benefits to minority entrepreneurs as well as to the American
people in general. As explained in the next Part, the time is ripe for rees-
tablishing this program as a method for ensuring minority participation in
the communications industry for the next millennium.
III. REESTABLISHING THE TAX CERTIFICATE PROGRAM: AN
INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACH TO PROMOTING PUBLIC
INTEREST OBJECTIVES
The current state of minority participation in the communications in-
dustry underscores the need for reestablishment of the tax certificate pro-
gram not only in the broadcast and cable industries, but also in all commu-
nications industries, including services subject to competitive bidding. The
Telecommunications Act's provisions relaxing the broadcast ownership
rules4' have resulted in a significant increase in the concentration of broad-
46. MINORITY MEDIA & TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, WHY THE FCC's TAX
CERTIFICATE POLICY SHOULD BE RETAINED 3 (1995).
47. FCC's Tax Certificate Program: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
104th Cong. 131 (1995) (statement of the Minority Media & Telecommunications Council).
48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56, 110-
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cast ownership in local markets. This has, in turn, resulted in an increase in
prices for broadcast properties, making it more difficult to purchase sta-
tions. These circumstances have led some media brokers to declare that
"'[r]adio, for all practical purposes, is consolidated. 49 As a result, minor-
ity entrepreneurs have fewer opportunities to compete meaningfully for the
purchase of broadcast entities. Indeed, the most recent NTIA Report re-
flected only a 2.9 percent level of minority ownership of commercial
broadcast stations-a level lower than that in the years immediately pre-
ceding the elimination of the program. 0 Moreover, the few existing mi-
nority broadcast station owners now must compete against non-minority
group owners who, because of their ownership of as many as eight radio
stations in some markets, can assume greater control over advertising
revenues, programming, and staff.51 In fact, as entertainer Stevie Wonder,
who owns station WJLH-FM in Los Angeles, testified before the FCC on
February 12, 1999, these difficulties are even more prevalent for single
station owners, even affluent owners such as Mr. Wonder. 52
In addition, as the Commission's Market Entry Barrier Report re-
vealed, access to financial capital continues to be a major obstacle to mi-
norities in all communications industries. 3 In the broadcast industry, this
limited access has forced many minorities to be relegated to the purchase
of less costly and less viable AM stations or FM stations in smaller mar-
kets.54 Further, Congress's decision to subject mutually exclusive commer-
cial broadcast stations to competitive bidding55 may further impede the
ability of minorities and women to acquire new stations by making the
pursuit of such stations even more capital intensive.
Minority entrepreneurs also continue to face difficulty obtaining suf-
ficient capital to acquire licenses and compete in telecommunications
56
services, including those subject to competitive bidding This difficulty
has been exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,57 that led the Commission to cease adoption of auc-
49. Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Going, Going, Gone... , BRDCST. & CABLE, Feb. 15, 1999,
at 33 (quoting Brian Cobb of Media Venture Partners).
50. NTA Report, supra note 2. "Minority ownership of commercial broadcast stations
is at a lower level today than in 1994 and 1995."
51. Id.
52. Bill McConnell, Songs in Key of LMA Restriction, BRDCST. & CABLE, Feb. 15,
1999, at 10.
53. Market Entry Barriers Report, supra note 3, para. 215.
54. NTA Report, supra note 2.
55. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 3090)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
56. Market Entry Barriers Report, supra note 3, para. 215.
57. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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tion provisions that provided bidding credits and other incentives to mi-
58
norities and women.
A new tax certificate program clearly could address this obstacle.
Such a program could provide a much needed tax-benefit incentive for
sellers of communications facilities to sell their licenses to minority entre-
preneurs. A new tax certificate program could also ensure opportunities for
minority entrepreneurs to compete for ownership in all communications
industries including those subject to competitive bidding.
In the view of the Authors, the FCC as the expert agency on commu-
nications matters should administer this new program. Congress's concern
regarding the lack of monitoring by the IRS could be addressed by requir-
ing the IRS to monitor the tax implications of the program and to report its
findings to Congress and to the President. Further, the FCC could be re-
quired to coordinate with the Department of Treasury to set limits on the
amount of tax-deferred benefits in a given transaction to ensure efficient
use of the tax-deferred benefits. To facilitate oversight responsibility, the
FCC and the IRS could form a joint working group to coordinate their re-
spective policies for the issuance and use of tax certificates.6°
The new tax certificate program should apply not only to broadcast
and cable properties, but also to all other communications services. As
noted above, minorities continue to have difficulty accessing capital not
only in the purchase of broadcast and cable properties, but also in all spec-
trum-based services. Applying the program to all of these services would
foster "the diversity of control of a limited resource, the spectrum" 6'-a
goal the Commission found to serve the public interest.
58. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-
Competitive Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 136, para. 1, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 934 (1995) (eliminating minority and female-specific auction incentives for the PCS C
block auction in light of the Adarand decision). As the Commission noted in its Market
Entry Barriers Report, many parties complained that they actually lost investors when the
Commission eliminated these provisions for the PCS C block auction in response to Ada-
rand. Market Entry Barriers Report, supra note 3, para. 219 n.543.
59. Providing the Commission with authority to establish a tax certificate program that
would apply to services subject to auction as well as to broadcast and cable would restore to
the Commission the authority it held prior to 1995. As noted above, Congress specifically
authorized the Commission to consider tax certificates among the tools used to ensure that
small businesses, minority and women entrepreneurs, and rural telephone companies ob-
tained opportunities to participate in spectrum-based services subject to competitive bid-
ding.
60. The proposal for a joint FCCIRS working group was suggested in Erwin G. Kras-
now and William E. Kennard, A Constructive Proposal to Improve the FCC's Tax Certifi-
cate Policies, BRDCST. CABLE FIN. J., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 30-31.
61. 1978 Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d at 981,42 Rad. Reg. 2d at 1692.
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Adoption of a new tax certificate program that applied to auctionable
services would provide the Commission with a continued mechanism to
fulfill Congress's continuing mandate under the Communications Act to
"ensure that small business, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women are given the opportu-
nity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services."62 In addi-
tion, this program would allow the Commission to fulfill another require-
ment imposed in the Telecommunications Act to "eliminate market entry
barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and
ownership of telecommunications services and information services"63 and
to "seek to promote the policies and purposes of this Act in favoring diver-
sity of media voices, vigorous economic competition, technological ad-
vancement, and promotion of the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity.
,64
Reestablishing the tax certificate program would also foster the par-
ticipation of woman-owned businesses in the communications industry. As
the Commission noted in its Market Entry Barriers Report, woman-owned
businesses, like minority-owned businesses, have also faced difficulty in
65
attracting capital. Moreover, as is the case with respect to minority-
owned businesses, Congress has continued to recognize the need for dis-
semination of licenses to a wide variety of applicants including women66
and to require the Commission to ensure opportunities for the participation
of woman-owned businesses in spectrum-based services. 67
Any statutory authority given to the Commission under the new tax
certificate policy, should permit, but not require, the FCC to make the pro-
gram available to all small businesses. Such authority would be consistent
with the authority the Commission held prior to 1995 with respect to spec-
trum-based services subject to auction. Moreover, this approach would be
consistent with Congress's mandate that the Commission eliminate market
entry barriers for small businesses. Indeed, as the Commission found in its
Market Entry Barriers Report, small businesses also found it difficult to
access capital for purposes of acquiring communications facilities. 6" Fi-
nally, the establishment of a tax certificate program geared toward small
business would likely carry significantly fewer litigation risks from those
62. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (1994).
63. Id. § 257(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
64. Id. § 257(b).
65. Market Entry Barriers Report, supra note 3, para. 215.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(C) (1994).
67. Id. § 3090)(4)(D).
68. Market Entry Barriers Report, supra note 3, paras. 30-37.
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who would be inclined to challenge the program under Adarand and Lu-
theran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, at least until such time as the
Commission can complete its efforts to gather sufficient evidence in sup-
port of minority and woman-specific incentives to withstand judicial scru-
tiny.70 In fact, as former FCC Commissioner Henry Rivera suggested, there
is evidence that minority and female entrepreneurs would benefit from a
program geared toward small businesses.7 ' For example, despite the exis-
tence of business incentives limited to small businesses, minority entre-
preneurs have been successful in acquiring a total of 496 licenses in wire-
less services subject to auction. This number includes licenses for capital-
intensive businesses such as those licensed to the Broadband Personal
72Communications Service and the Local Multipoint Distribution Service.
In light of these factors, the better approach, at least initially, would be to
establish a tax certificate program that applies to small business entities.73
The concerns raised by Congress in 1995 could be addressed under a
new statutory authority. For example, any concern that the FCC would
create a program that extended beyond the intent of Congress could be ad-
dressed by enacting a statute that set forth the specific parameters by
which the Commission could implement a tax certificate program. Simi-
larly, Congress's concerns regarding the FCC's administration of the pro-
gram could also be addressed in such a statute. To eliminate the "flipping"
of broadcast and cable properties acquired through the use of a tax certifi-
cate, Congress could require the Commission to establish a longer holding
period for entrepreneurs who purchase properties pursuant to tax certifi-
69. Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, 154 F.3d
487 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
70. In Lutheran Church, the D.C. Circuit questioned the nexus between program diver-
sity and employment of minorities at broadcast stations. Lutheran Church involved the
FCC's equal employment opportunity rules, while the tax certificate program would address
more directly minority ownership, which the Authors believe has a closer nexus to diversity
of programming. However, because both policies, at least with respect to broadcast and ca-
ble, originally were intended to foster program diversity, the potential exists for the Lu-
theran Church decision to be used as the basis for challenging a minority-specific tax cer-
tificate program. Although the Authors would prefer a new tax certificate program focused
on minority and female entrepreneurs, the realities of the current congressional and judicial
climate suggest that, at least in the short term, a more pragmatic approach would be to es-
tablish a program aimed at small businesses.
71. Kennard Suggests New Approach to Tax Certificates, supra note 4. Former FCC
Commissioner Rivera noted that any program geared toward small businesses would aid
minority businesses as well.
72. This information was provided by the Federal Communications Commission,
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auction and Industry Analysis Division.
73. Under a sufficiently broad statutory authorization, the FCC could adopt minority
and female-specific tax certificate incentives should it decide that it has sufficient evidence
to withstand judicial review.
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cates. In addition, Congress could require the FCC to adopt more stringent
definitions of "control." For example, in authorizing the Commission to
implement a tax certification program, Congress could require the FCC to
adopt a specific threshold of equity that a minority or other entrepreneur
must hold in the purchasing company and require integration of ownership
and management to protect against "fronts" or shams. Further, to address
Congress's previous concern regarding the financial magnitude of transac-
tions that were subject to the previous tax certification program, Congress
could require that the FCC set limitations on the amounts for transactions
that would qualify for a tax certification. For example, Congress might di-
rect the Commission to establish a maximum amount for broadcast trans-
actions, another amount for cable transactions, and other amounts for vari-
ous wireless service transactions. Because the program would be used as
an incentive for a variety of different services, the Commission should be
given the discretion to tailor the transaction size limitations to the charac-
teristics of each service.
Finally, Congress's concern regarding lack of monitoring of the
benefits of the program could be addressed by a requirement that the
Commission submit a report to Congress and the President regarding the
status of the program. Such an approach would be consistent with previous
requirements regarding other communications regulatory policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Minorities continue to face difficulty accessing capital and, as a re-
sult, remain grossly underrepresented in the ownership of broadcast, cable,
and other communications facilities. This problem has been exacerbated
by the broadcast multiple ownership provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act as well as recent court decisions restricting the use by the FCC of
minority-specific programs. These developments have resulted in a de-
crease in opportunities for minorities (and women) to participate in the
communications industry. These circumstances create a compelling public
interest in reestablishing the tax certificate program. As demonstrated
above, the previous program proved to be a highly effective, nonintrusive
method for promoting minority ownership in the communications industry.
More importantly, the tax certificate program should be reinstated by the
Congress because it is the right thing to do.
74. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (1994) (requiring the FCC to release an annual
report on competitive market conditions with respect to commercial mobile radio services);
Id. § 548(g) (requiring the FCC to submit to Congress an annual report on the status of
competition in the market for the delivery of video programming).
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